Nigerian nascent democracy in 1999 has witnessed a rising public expectations in the realm of protection and enforcement of the rights of citizen which seemed to have been eroded during country's experience of Military rule and guarantee minimum levels of security. Th e immense powers exercised by governments over their own citizens have arisen almost entirely from the collective aspirations of the citizen at large, aspirations which depend for their fulfi llment on government intervention in many areas of our national life, and which no democratic political actors can ignore.
2 Th e facts however remains that a powerful executive is inherent characteristic of the Nigerian modern democracy. Th e proper role of the judiciary in constraining the action of the legislature and the executive thus became imperative. 3 Nigeria as a society divided along the line of ethnicity, regionalism, and religious dichotomy most oft en do experience lot of controversies, and appeal of litigation has been particularly strong with citizens' increasingly viewing judicial intervention as principal opportunity to shape the public sphere. Th e Nigerian Constitution 1960 Constitution , 1963 Constitution , 1979 and 1999 (as amended in 2010) placed the judiciary in this tasking position with a number of provisions that deal with structure, functions and powers of the judiciary. 4 It introduced a unifi ed system in all the states. Th e Constitution introduced judicial system in hierarchy viz. Th e Supreme Court of Nigeria, the apex court of the land, the Court of Appeal and the High courts, Shariah Courts' of Appeal and Federal High Court. Although the Constitution contains specifi c provisions relating only to the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and Federal High Courts it leaves the subordinate judiciary to the states.
Th us, the judiciary plays a vital role as social activist in the Nigerian progressive democratic reality. Th is growing role and level of judicial intervention depend on the Nigerian legal system where it operates a written Constitution, thus judiciary still exercise only a limited power just as the other institutions of the executive and the legislature. Th e role of the Nigerian judiciary is basically in the realm of disputes settlement and interpretation of Constitution or Statutes. 5 However, in Nigeria like many countries operating written Constitution, judici- ary has been under attack for assuming a posture of imperialism or supremacy in the scheme of governance. Th is proposition may not be true in that the powers are ultimately as limited as is that of the executive and the legislature in their several assignments. 6 However the provision of the Constitution enables the institutions to provide checks and balances on each other if any indulge in excessive, arbitrary or tyrannical use of the power.
Against the above backdrop and by virtue of section 6(6) of the Nigerian Constitution the judiciary has come to exercise vast powers of judicial review from which judicial activism metamorphous in respect of the legislative and executive functions. Th e judiciary as represented by Courts not only act as the third independent arbiters to determine disputes that may arise between the federal and states but also protect and enforce the fundamental rights of the citizens against the arbitrary action of the states. Th ey also interpret the laws made by the legislature and they have the fi nal say in the validity of any legislative or executive action of the state if it contravenes or abridges the fundamental rights of citizens. Th us the Nigerian judiciary as represented by courts generally performs one or all of the following functions in constitutional democracies:
1. Interpretation of the Constitution or law; 4. Determining the validity of legislative, quasi-legislative, executive or quasi-judicial actions on issues that touch the Constitution; 10 and 5. Determining the consistency or inconstancy of a legislation to the Constitution by applying and interpreting the laws of the legislature.
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Th ese functions give the courts ability to provide citizen with limited access to the majority-led legislature and executive an enabling environment to challenge unpopular and oppressive policies through the litigation.
12 Admittedly courts have come to exist for the protection of and enforcement of citizens' rights who put their views across with all potency for them to vent their feelings. Th is paper argued for the concept of judicial activism with the object of demonstrating that the judiciary as represented by Courts employs the concept within its constitutional powers and limitations to ensure compliance with rule of law and see that justice is always achieved. Th is paper will argued in favour of judicial activism and the necessary implication of activist court establishing the rule of law, protection of citizen rights, limiting excess in governance and determining the validity of legislation, legislative and executive actions through checks and balances scheme of the Constitution and purposeful interpretation of laws. Th e paper is limited to the exploration of judicial role within the concept of separation of powers with particular reference to the Supreme Court being the fi nal court of appeal in the hierarchy of courts and whose decision binds all other lower courts.
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II Historical Development of Judicial Activism in Nigeria
Instructively the concept of judicial activism has its origin from the English common law imported into the country 14 Nigeria and more particularly infl uenced by the United States of American judicial practice which is attached to the very original debate about constitutional interpretation framed in terms of broad versus strict construction or narrowly and or broadly. 15 Signifi cantly the origin of judicial activism is linked to the power of judicial review asserted by the Supreme Court in Marburry v Madison in 1803. 16 Incidentally, there is no provision in the United States Constitution where the power of judicial review is contained. 17 
III Th e meaning and legal basis for judicial activism
Like any catchword judicial activism acquires its real meaning when construed from context this is because defi nitions of concept are usually products of individual idiosyncrasies and it is oft en infl uenced by the individuals' perception or world view, a combination of various defi nitions gives a description of the concept. 30 However, it has been observed by a great philosopher, Aristotle 31 that:
Th e notion of law …has defi led any fully satisfactory defi nition or explanation. Indeed, the problem of defi nition of word looms large in jurisprudence and traverses the entire terrain of law, thus creating nightmare for lawyers.
It is instructive to note at the outset that judicial activism is not a monolithic concept rather it can represent a distinct jurisprudential ideas worthy of further investigation.
32 Notwithstanding, scholars have off ered diverse defi nitions of judicial activism. It may be necessary to give the defi nition of the concept of judicial activism from the two opposing dimensions proff er by scholars: Judicial Activism is that way of exercising judicial power which seeks fundamental recodifi cation of power relation among the dominant institutions of state, manned by members of the ruling classes. 33 Similarly, judicial activism is viewed as Peter Russell 34 as meaning: Judicial activism is the judicial vigour in enforcing constitutional limitations on the other branches of government and their readiness to veto those policies on the branches of government on constitutional grounds.
Against the above backdrop it must be noted that judicial activism can only acquire its real meaning when construed from the context and this depends upon the user's theoretical conception of the role of the courts in democracy. More importantly, the eff ect is that judicial activism is a conception of the courts' role as transcending the mere application of laws rather it support the notion the courts cannot ignore the laws enacted by the legislature, however it can expound, develop and even change it within its function.
35 Th e main justifi cation for this creative role is the necessity for the reconciliation of the rules with the wider objectives of justice 36 as can be rightly juxtaposed with observation of Oputa JSC thus;
Th e law will have little relevance if it refuses to address the social issues of the day. Legislators make laws in the abstract but the court deals with the day to day problems of litigants and attempts to use the laws to solve these problems in such way as to produce justice. 37 Th erefore where a defi ner of judicial activism construed it narrowly, as being restricted to mere application of the preexisting legal rules to the given circumstances he tends to consider even a liberal, purposeful or dynamic interpretation of the law as activism. Where a defi ner construed it as a wider role for court and expect it to perform the function of providing meaning to various opentextured expressions, insuffi ciently explicit provisions of the Constitution and giving them new meaning as required by the dynamism of law such as changes in changing contemporary and progressive are bound to consider judicial activism not as an aberration but as a normal judicial function.
Instructively, given the federal structure of Nigerian government 38 judicial activism may be constitutionally invoked to invalidate legislation, legislative or executive actions which are inconsistent with the Constitution. When the courts wield their power and strike down legislation their action implicates separation of powers issues because the Court's decision challenges policy choices made by the other institutions of government. However, such a judicial act carries with it the potential for awakening the legislature and the executive, including the choice of reversal through constitutional amendment or re-enactment of the invalidated legislation. 39 Th is is a beguilingly simple model of the relationship between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary in a representative democracy with responsible government. stantive results that may achieve the intent of the legislature or framer of the statute and Constitution. 41 Interestingly, the Court's liberally-oriented activism has led conservatives not eschew activist judicial review when it is, at least theoretically, more consistent with the concept of limited government favored by many conservatives. 42 Interventionist in the form of a Supreme Court exercise of its power may be viewed as a solution to the problem of how best to enforce rule of law, protect fundamental rights and interests in an oligarchy government as practice in Nigerian. Obviously, then, to make a reasonable decision about the legal disputes require not only an empirical assessment of the probable consequences of alternative processes in the concrete setting of a particular country, but also a judgment about the relative weight to assign to the democratic process in comparison with other values. 43 Notwithstanding, the concept of judicial activism has been subjected to criticism by it opponents on the ground that it allowed court to usurp the power of other institutions of government however, the best answer to such criticism can be found in the word of Hon Justice Michael Kirby, who posited that:
Nostalgic dreams of judges without choices, devoid of creativity, abjuring all 'activism' may be found in fairy stories. But for judges, lawyers and citizens who are obliged to live in the real world, it is necessary to face up to the requirements of judicial choice. Choice about the meaning of a constitutional text, choice about the interpretation of ambiguous legislation, choice about the application, extension, confi nement or elaboration of old principles of the common law to new facts, circumstances and times. 44 In the opinion of the author of this paper judicial activism is closely connected to the dynamic, creative and objective reading of constitutional text by the court. 45 In other words, a constitutional interpretation which requires continual updating of the Constitution in line with the perceived community and social expectations posits to achieve the object of the Constitution intended to endure for age long; as rightly observed by Lord Wright in the Australian case of James v. Commonwealth of Australia that: It is true that a Constitution must not be construed in any narrow and pedantic sense. Th e words used are necessarily general, and their full import and true meaning can oft en only be appreciated when considered, as the years go on, in relation to the vicissitudes of fact which from time to time emerge. It is not that the meaning of the words changes, but the changing circumstances illustrates and illuminates the full import of that meaning.
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IV Judicial-Legislative interaction enforcing constitutional limitations on legislative actions
Th is part of the paper begins with a discussion on the judicial, legislative and executive interactive principles of activism that animate the preposition of judicial activism. Th e part then analysed some judgments to elucidate the realities concerning the concept of judicial activism. Th e theory of ''institutional interaction, '' as conceptualized in this paper, may be view as a Nigerian perspectives to the debate over the legitimacy of judicial activism in a constitutional and developing democracy. According to this theoretical exposition, the institution of courts and the legislatures participate in government and with inherent level of interaction in the determination of the proper balanced role the Constitution designed for each institution and enforcing or limiting the balance on Constitutional ground on each.
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Th ere is strong rationale to view judicial activism as democratically legitimate in that it provides checks and balances as expected under the doctrine of separation of powers. Importantly, this interaction is continuous on the ground that the judiciary does not necessarily have the last word with respect to constitutionally disputed matters and policies in that the legislatures would almost always have the power to re-enact, reverse, modify, ignore or void a judicial decision nullifying legislation. Consequently the cry of judicial supremacy is objectionable in presence legislative supremacy the sustaining judicial activism within the paradigm of separation of power.
Th e theory of institutional interaction has emerged theoretically out of the Nigerian experience of constitutionalism and is based on Constitution. Th e theory of institutional interaction it is claimed, has been made possible by virtue of constitutional provisions, the most important of which are the section 1(3) ''Supremacy'' clause that override any legislation, legislative or executive action that is inconsistent with the Constitution. According to the section 4(8) legisla- tive actions are subject of judicial intervention and the Constitution also forbids the legislature from enacting laws to oust the jurisdiction of the courts. Th is theory of institutional interaction describes a peculiar feature of the Nigerian constitutional arrangement.
A Judicial-Legislative interaction vide interpretation of legislation
While it is the power of the legislature to enact law, the interpretation of the law and legislative action stemming there from is vested in the judiciary as represented by the courts. 48 Essentially, aside from the Constitutional power of judicial interpretation there are certain predictive factors that can stimulate interpretation.
It is instructively posited that the words used in legal instruments may sometimes be abstract, or that their meaning indeterminate when applied to various concrete circumstances, or that the application of law requires an intervening act of interpretation, of which the precise nature and signifi cance is largely undefi ned and contested.
49 Th e consequence of such an (apparently obvious) axiom is that while a distinction necessarily exists between the application of law and its creation, it is oft en claimed that interpretation, in applying words of oft en indefi nite meaning to various situations, may amount to a creative act and consequently a criticism that judges in interpreting law, in fact participate in its creation.
50 Th e correct position can be distilled from the observation of Ogwuegbu JSC in DSSS v Abgakoba 51 that the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is written organic instrument. It is a mechanism under which our laws are made and not mere Act of Parliament or a Decree which declares what law is. It has been an accepted canon in interpretation of document to interpolate into the text such provisions not though expressed as are essential to prevent the defeat of their purpose and this applies with special force to the interpretation of Constitution which, since they are designed to cover a great multitude of necessarily unforeseen circumstances, are cast in general language which are not constantly amended. 52 Th ough the problem inherent in judicial exercise of interpretative power is stated by MacLean that: … the process of interpretation is not said; "whenever it is possible and in response to the demand of justice the courts lean to the broader interpretation unless there is something in the rest of the Constitution to indicate that the narrow interpretation will best carry out the object and purpose of the Constitution. I don't conceive it is the duty of this court to construe any of the provision of the Constitution as to defeat the obvious ends the Constitution was designed to serve. " 52 ibid a humble one… rather than being the servants of the text, interpreters threaten to become its masters by devising and applying the rules by which sense is made of it; indeed, they threaten to become its masters to the point of laying down the law themselves. 53 Th ere are rules of legal methodologies for interpretation such as the Literal Rule, the Golden Rule, ' the 'Mischief Rule, ' Ejusdem Generia, Blue Pencil, Severability principle, these are mere semantic aids rather than linguistic devices for reading the text of the Constitution or Statutes. Th e absence of recognised, single and all encompassing binding methods of interpretation, and the resulting potential for lack of precision is particularly problematic as rightly observed in the case of Awolowo v Shehu Shagari 54 per Fatai Williams CJN that:
Some of these canons of interpretation take the form of broad principle only; consequently a common feature of most of them is that they are of little practical assistance in settling doubts about interpretation in particular cases. Th is is partly due to vagueness, but also because in many cases, where one canon appears to support a particular interpretation, there is another canon, oft en on equal status, which can be invoke in favour of an interpretation, which could lead to a diff erent result.
Th e above court proposition established the fact that some cannons of interpretation take the form outlined, especially in the cases of constitutional law. Th ese common principles of statutory interpretation have been considered unsuitable for interpretation of constitutional provisions, which in the nature of things tend to lay down general principles. Onu JSC observed that:
It is important to state that the Constitution cannot condescend in its description of every right guaranteed therein. Th e Constitution is an organic document which must be treated as speaking from time to time, it can only described rights it guarantees in broad terms, it is for the court to fi ll the fundamental right provisions with content such that would fulfi ll its purpose and infused them with life. A narrow and literal construction of human right or any provision in our Constitution can only make the Constitution arid in the sphere of rights. Such approach will retard the realization, enjoyment and protection of those citizen's rights and freedom and it is unacceptable. 55 Th us, there is no principle of interpretation fi rmly settled than the rule that court must deduce the intention of the legislature or framers of the Constitution from the words used in the law. If the words are in any way ambiguous, it is reasonably capable of more than one meaning of the provision in question the court may depart the natural meaning of the word. Th is preposition is supported by 53 MacLean, Supra note 47, 161, 54 ibid P 53, (1979) 6-9 SC 51 at 64 55 DSS v Agbakoba p. 95, Salmond, Jurisprudence, pp 131-140 the observation of Pat Acholonu JSC in the case of FRN V Osahon 56 that: Where a statute makes the meaning of a provision diffi cult to discern properly, it is the indispensible right of the court to explore deeper and try to make sense out of it in the context of the primary law so that it would, on its operation, following the construction of the court have meaning which it eventually wears and which would help to promote law optimized the cause of justice, the advancement of sociological jurisprudence of the rule of law.
It is contended in this paper therefore that words of Constitution or legislation may sometimes have a penumbra of uncertainty occasioning some marginal cases especially from the scenarios above enumerated. Th erefore, if marginal cases must occur the duty of a judge in construing them must be legislative. 57 More importantly the spirit of the constitution or statute is a fact unlikely to be encapsulated in the single word and even the whole text of the laws. It can rather be apprehended through adaptation of the text to diverse circumstances imposed with the passage of time. Th is is because constitution or statute is meant to endure for ages to come and to meet the various cases of human aff airs. In its decision the Supreme Court 58 citing the case of Nafi u Rabiu v Th e State 59 per Udo Udoma JSC said, …where the question is whether the Constitution has used an expression in a wider or narrow sense the court should always lean where the justice of the case so demands to the broader interpretation unless there is something in the context or in the rest of the Constitution to indicate that the narrow interpretation will best carry out its object and purpose.
Th us, rather than relying on predetermined meaning, the spirit of the laws admits shift of meaning. Th is is the kind of challenges court is expected to meet. It is also a challenge the contemporary constitutional or statutory text are suited for due to their relatively indeterminate language. Obaseki JSC in Attorney General Bendel State v Attorney General of the Federation said: While language of the Constitution does not change, the changing circumstances of progressive society for which it was designed can yield a new and further import to its meaning. Th us, principles upon which the Constitution is designed rather than the direct operation or literal meaning of the words used should measure the purpose and scope of its provisions. failed to provide and which is inevitably placed before the court to determine. Th e Court in exercising its interpretative power, inferred from the text of the Constitution in line with the development by construing the word die to admit further meanings which may be; stop living, stop working or stop existing within a rule as to death. Th us A judge has no discretion to include resignation, mental incapacity within such a rule.
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One signifi cant conclusion that can be drawn from the foregoing preposition on the penumbra nature of the words of Constitution or legislation is to accentuates the need for a judge to pay due regard to legislative intent without limiting the task of interpretation to the ascertainment of that purpose. Th e following is a very important illustration, closely related to the capacity of judges to intelligently articulate their positions in terms of plausible constitutional interpretation. How, for example, could a rabble in Muslims' Boko Haram, based in the cities of Northern Nigeria, possibly be authorised to call onto the heads of all the Christian and other religious followers in the Country for all future time a blood curse such as would justify their demand for Islamisation of the Country? How, in the context of a religion dedicated to the message of the love of God, and of one another, could such a passage possibly be so interpreted? How, other than by the most mindless literalism, could anyone construe any verse of such meaning, as Muslims Boko Haram did, to justify their demand for Shariah in Nigeria and the dreadful acts of bombing and killing perpetrated against innocent citizens?
It is this paper's belief, a good illustration of the dangers of literalism, originalism or textualism. Th is is such a debased and discredited approach to the interpretation of language (whether in the Quran, Bible or in a constitution or legislation) that it hardly seems necessary to elaborate why it is so misguided. Yet the literalists and the textualists are now in full fl ight. Th ey want judges to stick as closely as possible to the text of the statute and even, Mirabelle dictum (expression of wonder), to the original intention of the framers of the Constitution.
62
B Judicial-Legislative interaction vide legislative action
In this realm, this paper develops a theoretical model of judicial and legislative interaction a contemplation of the doctrine of checks and balances. It uses this to compare outcomes generated in a system of legislative supremacy to outcomes generated in a system in which judicial activism is provided by a legally principled and constitutional activist judiciary.
63 Th e paper then shows that judicial activism, even when exhibited by an activist, or politicized, can promote important constitutional values and improve legislative quality relative. 
, outset it is instructive to note that judicial activism of the court cannot be used to query the legislative power to enact laws that is not within the prerogative of the judiciary. Th e Courts are most oft en reluctant to rule in favour of invalidation of legislation.
However, the Courts as the custodian of the Constitution may have a willing ability to invalidate legislation in the face of its aberration. In support of this preposition it is contended that legislative action must always be based on the Constitution, thus is posited that in any of the following theoretical prepositions where the legislature fails thereon judicial activism is invited on constitutional ground. Th ey are:
1. When legislation off ends the principle of separation of power or the principle of federalism; 2. When legislation is inconsistent with the provision of the Constitution; 3. When legislation is aimed at taking away individual rights guaranteed under the Constitution; and 4. When the legislature failed to comply with the procedure set down to doing a particular act.
Within the above framework, it is neither judicial institution trespasses on the role of the legislature. Legislature respects the judicial rule in order to avoid interfering with the role of the courts. Th e courts respect legislative propriety to make, amend, repeal, re-enact laws and do not become involved with the internal workings of the legislature. Instructively there is absent of protection against judicial intervention on legislative function in the Nigerian Constitution rather it further prevent such intrusions by forbidding the legislature from enacting laws that oust or purport to host the jurisdiction of judicial function. Lord Woolf 64 was prepared to defi ne a limit on the supremacy of parliament which it would be the responsibility of the courts to identify and uphold. He explicitly said:
As a matter of fundamental principle, it is my opinion that the survival and fl ourishing of a democracy in which basic rights (of which freedom of expression may be taken as a paradigm) are not only respected but enshrined requires that those who exercise democratic, political power must have limits set to what they may do: limits which they are not allowed to overstep. If this is right, it is a function of democratic power itself that it be not absolute. institutional body could alter the democratic essence of the Constitution. Th is case initiated and developed the court's jurisprudence around what became known as the "basic structure doctrine". In terms of this doctrine, the court was in charge of preventing the erosion of those enduring values that constitute the essence of constitutionalism. 71 Similarly, in Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala 72 by a majority of 7-6, the court held that under Article 368 of the Constitution, Parliament undoubtedly had power to amend any provision of the Constitution but the amendatory power did not extend to alter the basic structure or framework of the Constitution. Th e Supreme Court was of the view that the basic structure of the constitution included, inter alia, that Constitution is supreme; the form of government is republican and democratic; the doctrine of secularism; the doctrine of separation of powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, and the nature of federal character of the Constitution. Th is decision is a typical manifestation of creativity in the form of judicial activism. 73 Notwithstanding the judicial position in the above cases, it is apposite to state that the legislature is not accountable to the courts in respect of their legislative functions. However, the legislature is accountable for creating an inroad to judicial intervention in determination of the legality and or consistency of such functions. While deciding the above cases, the court kept in mind the diff erence between legality, consistency and merit as also between judicial propriety and merit of its intervention. It may thus be argued that legislature invited judicial activism for their preferences as democratically elected members of government. Th ere is therefore signifi cant force in the observation of Venderbit that: it is in the courts and not the legislature that our citizens are primarily fallen keen, cutting edge of the law. If they have respect for the work of the courts, their respect for the law will survive the shortcomings of every other branch of government. However if they lose their respect for the work of the courts, their respect for law and order will vanish with it to the detriment of the society. 74 Instructively therefore, it is more appropriate for courts to intervene against legislative aberration of the constitution at least when reviewing ordinarily their action or legislation. Such judicial activism represents a warranted intrusion of the judiciary into democratic decision making. 75 Th is paper thus contends that judicial activism of the courts' invalidation of legislation is justifi ed and capable of achieving and stimulating the followings:
1. Eliminate imperfections arising from hasty draft ing of statutes or absurdities that could only be manifested in concrete situations. 2. Expose the lacuna in a legislation and give direction to assist amendment 3. Suppress the mischief which the law aimed at and advance remedy 4. Serves a purpose of awakening the legislature conscience to make amend 5. Provide generally-applicable rules for future; it is done, so that their orders may resemble legislation to some onlooker. 6. Inspire the legislature to re-enact an invalidated legislation.
Th us where there is constitutional provision setting out the procedure for any legislative action any default in the procedure in exercise of legislative power is actionable and liable to judicial scrutiny 76 . Th e justifi cation for judicial activism within this premises is that if in the process of exercising legislative power by the National or states' Assembly there is such a constitutional defect as to lead to an interpretation to the eff ect that a bill was not passed according to law, that is, it does not follow the procedure laid down under the constitution of passing of the bill, then the bill which has passed through such exercise is null and what the President assents to, an exercise of the executive power within the legislative process is a nullity, the Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under section 212 when there is a dispute under the section could adjudicate on the issue. 77 Conclusively, the limitations on legislative authority and affi rmative action guaranteeing liberty can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of the courts of justice whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenure of Constitution void without this, all reservations of the particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing. 78 Th us, the notion of judicial supremacy cannot be real since the courts do not have the last say in view of the legislative power to amend, re-enact or ignore an invalidated legislation as succinctly explained by the Supreme Court that:
Th e National Assembly has the power, in the course of legislating, or making law, to nullify or abrogate decisions of any court of law, including the Supreme Court, the highest Court of the land. In other words, courts of law cannot question the vires of the legislature to nullify or abrogate an invalidated law and once that is done, the particular decision of the court will no more have the force of law. But that is only one side of the coin. Th e other side is that the courts, in the exercise of their judicial powers under Section 6 of the constitution, have the jurisdiction to nullify legislation, which is not enacted in accordance with the constitution 79 .
V Conclusion
It is the conclusion of this paper that judicial activism is a noble concept for attaining justice and achieving democratic development and well entrenched in doctrine of separation of powers. Th erefore, it is expedient to note that in exercising interpretative role or disputes settlement courts must employ modes of interpretation that are consistent with an activist approach to avoid absurdity or perpetration of injustice which is not intended by the Constitution. Th ese models include the broad, liberal approach and the contextual, purposive approach.
It is only those modes of interpretation that take into account the purposes or objects of the Constitution; the context and the overarching principles on which the Constitution was founded; as well as the values underlying the inclusion of a particular right in the Constitution that are truly consistent with an activist nature of interpreting the Constitution. Th e Nigerian Constitution provides for separation of power between the three arms of government i.e. the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. Each is no doubt supreme in its area of authority as conferred on it by the Constitution but in so far as it confi nes itself to and act within the power conferred on it. If it exceeds such powers or acts in contravention of it or in confl ict with the provision of the Constitution, it would be the duty of the judiciary to put it in check at the instance of any aggrieved. Th ere is no doubt about the fact that no Court would abdicate its authority in this regard. For example if the resolution of any of the Houses National Assembly relates to matter within its competence, no matter how off ensive it might appear to be, the Court would not interfere provided no outside right is infringed. Each arm of government is sworn to protect, preserve and defend the Constitution and the Court would in my view be failing in it duty if it hold itself helpless and unable to off er redress to an aggrieved party whose right is infringed or threatened.
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Judiciary is primarily a legal institution that exercises both constitutional and statutory interpretation while establishing precedents intended to direct the decisions of all lower courts. Notwithstanding, the Court is also a political institution that is situated in a complex separation of powers 81 providing checks and balances with justices who are members of the society and hold their own political values and ideology. Th e judiciary, represented by courts cannot, on its own volition, implement its decisions, as the justices merely have judgment and must rely on the support of the elected branches. Th e justices' decisions, as a result, oft en recent multiple considerations is related to the law, politics, and the Court's position in the larger separation of powers.
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Th is paper concludes with the preposition of Hon Justice that: It is to be hoped that….it will emerge the beginnings of a more realistic understanding of the duties and responsibilities of the judiciary, the genius that lies behind its creative capacity, the complete legitimacy of properly fulfi lling that capacity and the serious error of formalism, originalism and other non-contextual approaches to the ascertainment of the content of law. Truly, it is those who preach these doctrines who are the activists. Th ey are seeking to change the creative features of our law and the functions of the judicial branch that have existed for centuries. Th ey must not succeed for theirs is a counter-reformation that would put back the course of legal history. 83 Certainly, the judiciary in Nigeria with its power of fi nality of decisions on interpretative and adjudicatory jurisdictions cannot be on the same constitutional pedestrian with the executive and legislative organs whose actions, inactions, omissions, decisions or interpre tations of the law and the constitution may be call to question before the judici ary. Th e legislature and executive though enjoy supremacy, the fact is still that their supremacies are still subject to the constitutional supervision by the judiciary to ensure that the will of the people of Nigeria as enshrined in the Constitution is strictly complied with by the organs, and that is the constitutionalism; the overriding judicial activism and oversight of the political branches of government. 
